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“Almost everyone deals in ‘art’; this week the baker offered me 
a Gabriël which, however, turned out to be a clumsy forgery”, 
reported the Hague art dealer A.J. Boer in his 1943 book Kluchten 
en drama’s in den kunsthandel (Farces and Drama in the Art Trade). 
Boer wanted to educate lay people on the effects of this boom on 
the art market. Due to fast rising prices and a lack of imports, the 
market was flooded with lesser quality paintings and outright kitsch. 
Issues surrounding price, quality and authenticity of artworks, as 
well as large-scale exports to Germany of Dutch cultural heritage 
and kitsch, instigated several attempts to regulate the market. 
The accommodating as well as the collaborating departments in 
the Dutch civil service, the German Aufsichtsverwaltung (the civil 
administration which supervised the Dutch civil service), the Dutch 
government in exile, and even Göring himself tried control various 
aspects of the art market. 
This boom started right after the Dutch capitulation in May 
1940 when the two most important art collectors in Nazi-Germany – 
Hitler and Göring – were buying art on a large scale. In their wake, 
a large number of Nazi officials and other Germans followed. Given 
this sudden buying frenzy, it is hardly surprising that the scarce older 
literature on art markets identifies the two men as the driving force 
behind this boom. My aim here is to show how the use of statistics 
and basic economic price theory leads to a better understanding of 
what happened on the art market during World War II, and why. 
When trying to understand the development of price and volume, 
it is necessary to build databases of art sales and prices. In such 
an enterprise it is essential to make sure that the recorded prices 
were actually attained and that these works of art and prices were 
representative of the market. The methodology should be approached 
with no less caution. Indices based on average or median prices do 
not account for shifts in quality, therefore their results are easily 
skewed. This can be mitigated somewhat through choice of data, 
and by comparing mean and average prices. The repeat-sales 
method – which looks at price increases at different times of sales 
of the same artworks – is also easily skewed, especially in such a 
short timeframe as the duration of World War II. Hedonic regression, 
however, deals with all these issues because price is determined by 
the characteristics (artist, quality, authenticity) of an artwork and the 
price development of its market. Using this approach, I can construct 
an index of price development on the markets for artwork which 
comprises modern paintings, paintings from the romantic period, 
and old masters. The analysis yields results which are shown below, 
superimposed on a newspaper article about the boom. These indicate 
a slight increase in prices by 1941 (in volume, an aspect not covered 
44Regional Dynamics / Regionale Dynamiek
Development of prices on the art market 1940-1945 (index 1940=100), superimposed on part of a newspaper article on art as 
investment in De Telegraaf, 22 May 1941.
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here, the boom had already started), with the boom taking off the next 
year and lasting until the very end of the German occupation.
Insights into the development of prices and volume – while 
helping to prove the boom and providing insight into taste and so 
on – do not explain why such a boom occurred nor who was actually 
buying all of these objects. Here, again, insights from economics 
help explain what happened. To fuel their war effort, the Germans 
decided to exploit the Dutch economy to the fullest extent possible. 
Although this resulted in full employment, the money earned could 
hardly be spent because goods such as food and clothing were 
rationed and prices were kept stable. As the volume of money in 
savings accounts mounted, so did inflationary pressure. This was 
because the Germans paid in Marks, which De Nederlandsche Bank 
exchanged for guilders, forcing the Dutch money presses to work 
overtime. The increase in the money supply was so great that already 
in the spring of 1941 the press was talking about a widespread fear of 
inflation that was causing the Dutch population to invest in goods of 
lasting value, namely, art. Meanwhile, where there is rationing, there 
is also a black market. As prices on the black market increased, black 
marketeers possessed ever larger amounts of cash money. Because 
they were aware that a currency reform would be implemented after 
the liberation, they too were investing in art. During the height of the 
Hunger Winter, it was the black marketeers who pushed the art boom 
to new heights, as by then Germans and regular Dutch buyers had 
other concerns and were no longer active.
My initial research has broadened to the international art 
market in the period 1870 to 1970, specifically its reaction to political 
and economic crises, and processes of professionalization and 
canonization of modern art. However, my work remains firmly rooted 
in economic history. Typical of my Rotterdam approach is the variety 
of research methods and sources that I include. And, of course, 
studying the art market is a study in encounters between people, 
cultures, economies, nations, regions, ideas, and objects. 
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